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Abstract 
This study raises the question of what determines compliance with the OECD DAC framework 
on the basis of a case study of South Korea. This research argues that fragmented institutional 
structures limit the bureaucratic capacity for greater compliance. At the same time, the findings 
illustrate that lack of interest from dominant institutions can limit the consolidation of political 
will for change at the national level. This study has implications for future DAC donors in that 
special and peer reviews can be useful methodologies to identify current limitations for change. 
Finally, the study emphasises the importance of consolidated political will in terms of readiness 
to adopt global standards at the domestic level before commencing membership and obligatory 
processes. 
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Introduction 
 
Schools of international soft law have widely argued that international norms can achieve a 
higher level of implementation than domestic laws (for example, see Paulo and Reisen, 2010; 
Schäfer, 2006), and that peer review can be a flexible tool in adopting best practices in order 
to comply with these norms (OECD, 2007b; Pagani, 2002, p. 15). The peer review, defined as 
‘the systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a state by other states’, is 
known to be an effective compliance instrument in terms of implementing international 
frameworks, or soft laws, for member states. As such, peer review is a process of persuading 
member countries to implement standards and principles through the peer pressure exerted 
during the review process (Pagani, 2002; Paulo and Reisen, 2010). At the same time, as the 
peer review findings are made public, public scrutiny can influence a country’s behavioural 
change towards compliance with international norms (UNECA, 2002). The term ‘compliance’ 
used in this study thus refers to the adoption of and conformity to internationally agreed norms, 
standards and principles. 
Most international organisations have operated peer review systems amongst their member 
states. The World Trade Organisation (WTO), for example, uses a ‘trade policy review 
mechanism’ as a peer review tool for the purpose of monitoring trade policy and for the 
implementation of agreed principles by member countries (Pagani, 2002). Generally, 
international organisations conduct the peer review through three main phases, namely the 
preparatory, consultation and assessment phases, although some of them utilise a more 
complex process (UNECA, 2002). Just as international soft law is not a binding act, peer review 
likewise does not require judicial judgment. It is more common for peer review to be process 
of open dialogue aimed at encouraging the country under review to improve its compliance 
through adopting policies or best practices, standards or principles (Pagani, 2002). Trubek and 
Trubek (2005) argue that international bodies tend to provide guidelines for compliance rather 
than uniform rules, and that member states have a degree of freedom in achieving agreed 
objectives under soft law. As a result, member countries tend to design their own timetables 
and methods of implementation, which can cause them to lag behind in terms of compliance 
performance (Trubek and Trubek, 2005).  
It does not seem, therefore, that member countries always comply with international 
standards and principles even though they abide by the peer review process. Especially in the 
case of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC), even though member states are obliged to undergo peer review, 
the implementation level of DAC standards such as the Paris Declaration (PD), the Accra 
Agenda for Action (AAA) and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 
is not always high across member states. When the OECD DAC peer review examiners 
assessed countries’ aid delivery mechanisms and management structures, they found that DAC 
member donors showed different levels of responsiveness to OECD standards (De Renzio, 
2008; OECD, 2011a). According to the PD monitoring surveys, out of the 23 donor countries 
that signed the PD, no country fully met all its targets, thereby making the overall performance 
level rather disappointing. However, the donors’ performances vary: Denmark, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom (UK) showed higher levels of accomplishment, having achieved more 
than four or five PD indicators, while Japan, South Korea (hereinafter, Korea), Switzerland, 
the United States (US) and Turkey, only met one or two of the indicators (OECD, 2011a).  
Why then do some countries show lower implementation levels while others comply more 
fully with the agreed norms? What are the main causes of their failure to comply? Is it because 
peer pressure does not provide uniform rules but only recommendations, as Trubeck and 
Trubeck (2005) have suggested? Scholars such as Mahon and McBride (2009) argue that the 
OECD peer review recommendations are less powerful in terms of enforcement of standards 
in comparison with other international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the WTO and the World Bank. However, there is no obvious common denominator that 
fully explains the ties between non-compliance and the power of the international institutions. 
At the same time, Paulo and Reisen (2010) claim that failure to comply is precisely due to the 
fact that current international standards, especially those of the OECD DAC, are developed by 
traditional donors and that the peer review mechanism does not fully integrate emerging 
countries. However, this does not explain the cases of Japan, Switzerland and the US, whose 
level of compliance with PD targets were low even though they are considered to be traditional 
DAC donors. It seems then that it is the similar administrative arrangements and institutional 
structures of the European Union (EU) countries, rather than “DAC-ability” per se, which 
determines levels of compliance with DAC norms (Kim and Lightfoot, 2011; Rowlands, 2008).  
With these issues in mind, this study aims to examine why some governments are reluctant 
to adopt and conform to the global norms within the OECD DAC framework, despite their 
membership obligations and the role of peer pressure. It employs Korea as a case study not 
only because it is a new DAC member but also because it is a non-EU member state. Korea 
has been regarded as having DAC-ability as a result of achieving DAC membership in 2010, 
but its administrative arrangements and institutional structures are different to that of EU 
member states. As noted above, non-EU countries do not appear to conform to OECD DAC 
principles such as those contained in the PD and the final monitoring survey result 
demonstrated that countries like the UK, Sweden and Denmark show higher levels of 
implementation compared to non-EU countries such as the US, Japan and Korea (see OECD, 
2011a). However, Korea shares much in common with other non-European countries in that its 
aid systems is relatively diffuse and uncoordinated in comparison to those of so-called 
traditional European DAC members (Kim and Lightfoot, 2011; Rowlands, 2008). On top of 
that, most case studies of non-compliant countries have focused on traditional donors, but we 
have as yet relatively little understanding of whether theories built upon the European 
experience are commensurate with non-European cases such as Korea.  
In doing so, this paper begins by reviewing the existing compliance literature as there have 
been relatively few attempts to explain different levels of compliance through the peer review 
mechanism. The third section elaborates the research methodology used in the study, including 
the research propositions drawn from compliance theories and the methods used for data 
collection. As existing compliance theories are mostly based upon European cases and 
compliance around EU directives, the fourth section in this paper examines whether the 
propositions are consistent with OECD principles given that non-European countries are also 
members. The study then analyses the Korea's behavioural change with regards to OECD 
standards and assesses whether the Korean case is consistent with the research propositions, or 
whether there are different variables that can explain Korea’s low compliance levels by looking 
at the peer review processes and their results. Finally, the study concludes with a summary of 
the findings and discusses their implications for future non-European candidates for DAC 
membership. 
 
 
Compliance with International Normative Frameworks 
 
Scholars have debated the reasons why states comply, or do not comply, with international 
standards and principles, and have proposed a number of factors which may determine different 
levels of compliance. Early compliance theorists predominantly argued that some countries 
tend to comply with global norms due to enforcement mechanisms such as sanctions, while 
others scholars have relied more on procedural mechanisms of system management in 
explaining change. These competing arguments are known as enforcement and management 
models respectively (Tallberg, 2002). More recently, these two  approaches have been 
reinterpreted combining strategic choice theory with an enforcement model, and administrative 
constraints and national capacity theories with a managerial model (see Linos, 2003). In the 
former, the definition of enforcement focuses more on national preferences than power games 
between countries while others generally understand the enforcement mechanism in terms of 
sanctions (Börzel et al., 2010; Donno, 2010; Linos, 2003). In comparison, scholars such as 
Mbaye (2001) argue that factors influencing compliance include administrative constraints, 
strategic choice, institutional design and elite learning, multi-level governance and public 
opinion. Others, such as Chayes and Chayes (1993), argue that lack of behavioural change 
towards greater compliance is a result of three circumstances: the ambiguity of international 
law; the national capacity to adopt international norms; and the temporal dimension of changes. 
In addition, it has also been implied that domestic efforts can be a main determinant of 
compliance (UNECA, 2002). 
However, these variables, dealt with separately by various scholars, are in reality to be 
interlinked. For example, while Mbaye (2001) emphasises that administrative constraints imply 
a lack of national capacity, Chayes and Chayes (1993) emphasise national capacity as a 
dominant factor. With similarities to Mbaye (2001), Tallberg (2002) discusses limitations in 
national capacity while explaining the role of domestic system management. Börzel et al. (2010) 
have re-categorised those elements into different groups, such as enforcement, capacity and 
legitimacy. However, in some cases, it is unclear whether the non-compliance of particular 
state is a result of that state’s choice or lack of capacity (Donno, 2010). This, in turn, implies 
that mixed approaches need be applied when explaining the countries’ varying degrees of 
responsiveness to international agreements. With this in mind, this study attempts to synthesise 
the variables highlighted by the existing compliance literature into international and domestic 
frameworks. 
 
International and Domestic Variables 
 
As is conventionally believed, membership of international institutions influences national 
policies. As states obtain member status of an international organisation which has the ‘same 
policy preferences’ as national policies, it is easier for them to conform to international 
agreements than non-member states (Haas, 2008; Holzinger et al., 2008). In light of this, states’ 
decisions can also be influenced by international institutions, where institutions are defined as 
‘persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and 
shape expectations’ (Haas, 2008, p. 24), and these rules are the product of agreements by 
member states (Glodmann, 2012). However, this does not mean that member states always 
comply with the international laws induced by the organisation, as identical policy preferences 
do not mean identical domestic policies. In other words, there is still a high possibility of 
laggards despite similar notions of policies between supranational and national laws (for 
example, see Holzinger et al., 2008). This indicates the possibility of conflict between 
international standards and national interests (Abbott and Snidal, 2000). While national law 
reflects national interests, international law rather reflects the collective interests of member 
states. According to Goldmann (2012), it is highly likely that states distinguish international 
from national law, and they seem to differentiate between soft law and non-soft law within 
international law. Why then do some members have a greater tendency to comply with 
international principles when these global principles are not legally binding and do not fully 
reflect national interests? This can be explained in the ‘design of international principles’ by 
leading members of the international institutions (Paulo and Reisen, 2010). During the 
negotiation process, states tend to bargain close to their own national interests in designing 
standards and principles (Mbaye, 2001), and thus, the likelihood of dominance of key leaders 
within the broader membership becomes relatively high (Putman, 1988).  
Furthermore, there is a broad consensus that the domestic politics and objectives of the states 
have a strong relation with compliance. As argued above, international law is the product of 
mutual consent by states, whilst national law reflects state interests. Similarly, according to 
Haas (2008), signatories decide whether to comply with international agreements through their 
political calculations and national interests. Besides, even though they may have agreed to the 
international standards, a state’s decision at home relies on the country’s interests and 
preferences (Linos, 2003; Stiles and Thayne, 2006; Tarp, 2000). As such, divergent interests 
among different domestic coalition partners can impact levels of implementation through 
national policies (Hass, 1998; Mbaye, 2001). In other words, international norms are ‘located 
in the twilight between law and politics’ (Skjaerseth et al., 2006). At the same time, it has been 
argued that a lack of political will in the domestic system can limit response efficiency 
regarding the international requirements. As mentioned at the beginning of this study, the case 
of the PD signatories, whereby many members been reluctant implement PD norms, supports 
this argument (OECD, 2008b). Lack of political will can stem from divergent interests across 
domestic institutions, not only because they differentiate multiple laws on the basis of their 
own values, but also because they choose to comply with the specific laws under which they 
can achieve their ends (Abbott and Snidal, 2000; Goldmann, 2012). Differing objectives for 
each institution at the national level hinders the establishment of a consolidated political will 
to conform to the international law. This, in turn, is linked to the issue of actors within the 
domestic arena, which will be discussed later in this section. 
While state choice theory argues that countries decide their level of compliance based on 
their national interests and political calculations, it also implies the importance of political 
manoeuvring between institutions as a result of their conflicting interests and objectives. In 
comparison, state capability theory tends to emphasise the role of governmental administrative 
capacity in determining the degree of compliance as it illustrates why countries may have 
difficulties in implementing international agreements at home (for example, Mbaye, 2001). It 
is evident that states are not always capable of observing international standards even if they 
wish to do so (Haas, 2008). This is likely when national bureaucracies have low ability to adopt 
international norms to their domestic processes (Mbaye, 2001; Linos, 2003). In other words, a 
weak government bureaucracy can interrupt the implementation process, leading to a systemic 
delay. In the case of EU members, it has been argued that state structures, including ‘national 
administrative traditions,’ have influenced the implementation processes of international 
directives in each state (Linos, 2003, p. 12). Similarly, the styles of existing national policies 
can challenge compliance with international recommendations (Haverland, 2000). This can 
mean that states tend to do business as usual based on their existing structures, requiring strong 
leadership to affect a policy shift in government (Putman, 1998; Stiles and Thayne, 2006). This 
issue will be dealt with separately below by means of a theory of actors within states. 
Additionally, government resources required for processes such as policy design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation can also work as constraints on compliance. For 
instance, the relatively small size of Ireland’s public sector hindered its ability to implement 
EU policies due to its limited budget (Mbaye, 2001, p. 261). In other words, a state’s 
compliance depends on the government’s management capabilities for associated resources, 
such as staff time, political energy and costs (Haas, 2008; Stiles and Thayne, 2006). 
Furthermore, behavioural change involves having access to a sufficient transition period for 
countries to be capable of inducing compliance (Chayes and Chayes, 1993). 
The evidence above suggests a high correlation between the structural variables of the 
government and its administrative capability. In other words, factors which contribute to non-
compliance can be found in the number of institutional actors engaged. It can be argued that 
difficulties in the policy implementation process tend to escalate as the number of actors 
increases (Mbaye, 2001). Fragmented institutional structures tend to problematise 
implementation (Haverland, 2010), and so it is important to have centralised control from 
within the central government. At the same time, a large number of actors can also result in 
failure to achieve a consolidated political will. It is equally critical that coalition partners in the 
governmental structure achieve political consensus; otherwise, the implementation process can 
be delayed (Linos, 2003). Thus, if the government’s political system is polarised as opposed to 
fragment; this may also negatively influence the degree of compliance (Fang and Stone, 2012). 
In line with the fragmented structure of domestic institutions, actors with legislative powers 
can become another proxy for compliance. Domestic institutional veto players can prove to be 
persistent obstacles in the implementation process (Harverland, 2010; Linos, 2003). It is likely 
that implementation can be delayed due to key veto points in the government system, 
particularly when members are not interested or did not play critical roles in the negotiating 
process (Linos, 2003). These ‘powerful minorities’ in each institution can influence the 
necessary changes for compliance, and vice versa, especially when they are considering the 
compatibility of domestic laws and international laws (Putnam, 1988). At the same time, not 
only institutional actors, but also individual leaders can play a critical role in policy decision-
making activities (Haas, 2008; Mbaye, 2001; Putnam, 1988). In addition, actors from the public 
are equally important in the policy choices and implementation process (Mbaye, 2001).  
 
 
Methodology 
 
The major determining variables in terms of compliance levels can be understood as the 
state choice and state capability, their actors at the national level, as well as the design of the 
norms at the international level. Among these, the three factors at the national level are 
interrelated. For instance, actors within states, represented by institutional actors in the aid 
management system, tend to be closely connected to both state choice and state capability 
theory in terms of the efficiency of the bureaucracy and the issue of political will. The literature 
review above has revealed that the number of actors engaged matters in terms of assessing the 
efficiency of the bureaucracy for behavioural change, which in turn is related to state capability. 
Not only that, the role of the dominant power’s political arrangement amongst institutions is 
relevant in all three theories of compliance at the national level. It seems that establishing a 
consolidated domestic political will is critical when grasping the gap between a government’s 
interests and global norms. With this in mind, this study offers two propositions: firstly, 
fragmented institutional structures can limit a government’s bureaucratic efficiency in 
behavioural change for soft law abidance; and secondly, the lack of interest in change on the 
part of the dominant institution can be critical in the failure to establish a consolidated political 
will to implement global norms through national policies. As such, this study looks at domestic 
factors rather than systematic elements of soft law and organisational characteristics of 
international bodies. In line with these objectives, the following section will explore the general 
phenomena of OECD DAC membership in line with OECD principles and DAC peer review 
by examining each proposition. The study will then examine whether the propositions are 
consistent with the specific case of Korea, a non-European member country as well as a new 
DAC state.  
In terms of research methods, this study deals with document analysis and participatory 
observation. Traditionally, participatory observation has been mostly used in ethnographic data 
collection, and is strongly related to observation of people's behaviour. According to Morris 
(as cited in Adler and Adler, 1998), participatory observation is defined as ‘the act of noting a 
phenomenon, often with instruments, and recording it for scientific or other purposes’. In 
contrast to participatory observation, non-participatory observation ‘refrains from 
interventions in the field’; rather, it ‘follows the flow of events’ (Flick, 2002, p. 135). In this 
research, participatory observation was conducted in the Korea International Cooperation 
Agency (KOICA), where I undertook the role of in-house advisor for the Peer Review Aid 
Effectiveness Session. Non-participatory observation was also conducted at the Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance (MOSF) during the Peer Review Aid Effectiveness Session and at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) during preparation sessions of the peer review. 
As qualitative approaches are much more unstructured than quantitative methods due to their 
open-ended nature (Punch, 2005), predetermined categories and classifications were not 
deployed during the observations. By conducting participant and non-participant observations 
from within the government system, the aim was to witness the phenomena of behavioural 
changes and interactions between related institutions.  
 
 
OECD Principles and Peer Review for Effective Development Cooperation 
 
The OECD DAC has played a dominant role in establishing global norms and standards 
related to development cooperation. Both member and recipient states have participated in 
debates relating to aid effectiveness and effective development cooperation through the High 
Level Forums of the OECD DAC in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan 
(2011). In other words, the OECD has designed global standards, disseminated knowledge and 
assessed the progress of aid management systems in global governance (Mahon and McBride, 
2009). For example, the five principles and thirteen indicators of the PD have been used as a 
landmark for aid policies, strategies, and practices across countries. These were developed to 
maximise aid effectiveness by focusing on aid delivery and management mechanisms as part 
of a wider aim of supporting the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
In comparison, the AAA suggested new modalities of aid activities such as triangular 
cooperation and south-south cooperation. In the AAA, the role of civil society organisations 
(CSOs) as well as transparency issues were emphasised, and the need for separate approaches 
for fragile states was also discussed (OECD, 2011a). Accordingly, commitments to the PD and 
the AAA have been constantly referred to in OECD DAC peer reviews as dominant standards 
and principles for effective development cooperation, including aid management systems (for 
example, OECD, 2010a). 
According to the OECD, a peer review is an ‘examination of one state’s performance or 
practices in a particular area by other states’ (OECD, 2007b, p. 2). OECD peer review is 
designed to ‘improve the quality and effectiveness of development cooperation policies and 
systems’ and to ‘promote good development partnerships’ to contribute to poverty reduction 
and sustainable development. In this process, OECD peer review intends to promote the 
collective behavioural change of partners in development cooperation by increasing the mutual 
accountability of member states, reviewing their performance, and promoting the learning and 
sharing of peer practices (OECD, 2012c, p. 2). Based on this methodology, OECD DAC has 
encouraged its member states to implement OECD principles and indicators relating to 
development cooperation to different constituencies throughout the peer review process.  
The OECD DAC has five stages in its peer review process: preparation and planning of the 
review; fact-finding, analysis and report writing; the peer review meeting; approval, 
publication, and launch of the peer review; and follow-up (OECD, 2012c). The OECD DAC 
peer reviews are conducted once every four to five years for each member country, and the 
‘mid-term reviews’ are carried out between peer reviews. The mid-term review mechanism has 
been in practice since 2009 in order to monitor the performance of donors’ behavioural changes 
in line with the peer review recommendations (OECD, 2012c). Apart from the peer reviews, 
the OECD DAC has also conducted ‘special reviews’ for non-DAC donor countries upon 
request in order to strengthen or reform their development cooperation structures by using the 
methodology of peer reviews (for instance, OECD, 2011b, 2011c). Based on half a century of 
experience of donor peer reviews, the OECD DAC has developed and provided best practices 
in donor performance for effective aid delivery and results, and has also reviewed the 
challenges for donors in implementing OECD DAC principles and standards. This section, 
therefore, examines whether these OECD DAC experiences are commensurate with the two 
propositions proposed in the previous section. 
Based on the lessons learned through peer reviews across several countries, the OECD DAC 
has found that the institutional structures of aid management, or aid management systems, vary 
among members (see Figure 1) at the national level. As such, it has been suggested that member 
states decrease the number of institutional actors involved in development activities at the 
headquarter level and decentralise operational authorities at the field level. It has been revealed 
that such institutional reforms to integrated national development cooperation systems can 
enhance the effectiveness of international aid (OECD, 2008c).  
 
 
FIGURE 1. OECD Categorisation of Aid Management Systems 
 
 
Source: Adapted from OECD 2009, p. 31 
 
 
The OECD encourages DAC members to have one consolidated body responsible for 
implementing aid management, whether this is the ministry of foreign affairs or a separate 
ministry for development. Based on continuous discussions through peer pressure and learning 
processes throughout the peer reviews, countries such as Japan and Germany have restructured 
their institutional systems of development cooperation from a fragmented to consolidated form. 
Japan established the new Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in 2008 by 
merging key institutions into one agency in accordance with the peer review recommendations, 
as seen in Figure 2 (OECD, 2010b). Various aid organisations dealing with technical 
cooperation in Germany, including the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 
the Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH (InWEnt) and the Deutscher 
Entwicklungsdienst (DED), were merged into the Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbe (GIZ) under the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ) in 2011. Germany too had been repeatedly criticised in its peer reviews for its inefficient 
bureaucracy due to its dispersed institutional system and limited organisational capacity for 
effective aid delivery (OECD, 2010b).  
 
 
FIGURE 2. Japanese Institutional Integration Reform 
 
 
Source: Adapted from OECD 2010c, p. 54 
 
 
The OECD has argued that identifying and appointing a senior figure at the highest level of 
the system or its administrative leadership structure is as important as consolidating multiple 
development institutions in order to enhance the effectiveness of aid delivery (OECD, 2008c). 
In this, the political will of the high-level bureaucrats is highlighted. For example, it has been 
constantly emphasised that political commitment by top-level statement of the development 
cooperation or a clear official statement at the political representation level can contribute to 
consolidating development cooperation policy in countries, on the basis of lessons learned from 
donor country experiences (OECD, 2008c, 2009). 
According to the OECD, the effectiveness of the peer review methodology stems from 
international peer pressure directed at the national political level. While monitoring donor 
compliance with PD principles, it has been pointed out that lack of high-level support from 
officials and political leaders leads to insufficient behavioural changes in the implementation 
process (OECD, 2008a, 2009). This, in turn, can be interpreted as a result of the government 
seeking specific incentives and interests when deciding whether to adhere to the international 
principles (Molenaers and Nijs, 2011). As such, the OECD DAC has recommended countries 
to have a ‘clear top-level statement’ in order to effectively operate such a complex political 
environment at the national level (OECD, 2008c). For example, both Sweden and the UK 
expressed their political will to commit to the global aid effectiveness agenda and PD principles 
in their White Papers and aid bills and acts (for instance, see DFID, 2006; Sida, 2006). In 
contrast, the US implemented the PD requirements in a limited manner due to a lack of political 
will stemming from lack of interest amongst the dominant institutions dealing with 
development cooperation. Despite the government of the US being one of the signatories to the 
PD, the PD requirements did not prevail over related agencies due to their separate interests 
(Bissio, 2007; Wood et al., 2008). The US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
paid little attention to the harmonisation principle of the PD, and the National Foreign Trade 
Council of the US intentionally stopped using the country procurement system (PD indicator 
5b), on the basis of their own interests (Bissio, 2007; De Renzio, 2008; Martin, 2008).  
 
 
Peer Review and Behavioural Change in South Korea 
 
Korea obtained its DAC membership in late 2009, with membership status commencing 
officially from January 2010. Before joining the OECD DAC, Korea underwent a special 
review process in 2008 with examiners from Canada and Australia. In accordance with the 
recommendations provided, the Korean government made some minor changes in order to 
enhance its aid management system according to OECD DAC requirements. However, the 
changes have not been significantly realised, partially because the Korean government had only 
a three-year period to implement changes between 2008 (when the special review results were 
published) and 2010 (when Korea commenced the DAC membership). Compared to the 
Korean case, Japan spent around five years to change its aid management system. As Figure 2 
shows, Japan conducted a merger of key aid management institutions into one agency in 2008 
on the basis of the recommendations provided in the 2003 peer review (see OECD, 2003). 
 Even though Korea made few changes to its aid management system, it obtained OECD 
DAC membership. The first peer review was conducted in June 2012 by Australia and 
Germany. The peer review results were then published in December 2012. According to new 
regulations introduced by the OECD DAC, Korea is now expected to have a mid-term review 
in 2015 and another peer review within 2017. Korea has, therefore, followed the OECD DAC 
requirements for aid and development cooperation (PMO, 2012). However, the system of 
management in Korea has been different to that of other OECD DAC member countries. Prior 
to the special review of 2008, the institutional structure of Korea’s aid management was 
polarised, consisting of two governing ministries and two operational agencies. In terms of 
bilateral aid distribution, MOFAT and the MOSF were the main governing bodies. MOFAT 
has been primarily responsible for managing grants through KOICA whilst the MOSF has been 
in charge of overseeing loans through the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) 
managed by the Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank). Grant-type aid has been mainly 
administered by KOICA, which pursues integrated development including economic, social 
and sustainable development. Loan-type aid has been provided by Exim Bank, including the 
EDCF, which is aimed at fostering mutual economic cooperation. However, following the 
introduction by the MOSF of its Knowledge Sharing Programme (KSP) as a form of technical 
cooperation based on grants, MOFAT is no longer the sole agency responsible for grants. On 
the other hand, when dealing with contributions through multilateral channels, MOFAT has 
assumed the role of designated official agency to the UN system whereas the MOSF has 
performed a similar function with regards to multilateral development banks, such as the World 
Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the African Development Bank. Moreover, the Bank 
of Korea dealt with the subscriptions and loans under the MOSF’s supervision (Office for 
Government Policy Coordination of the Republic of Korea, 2005). Based on this institutional 
arrangement, MOFAT and the MOSF had thereby worked separately and independently 
without any superior governing body. Figure 3 demonstrates the former structure of the Korean 
aid management institutions. 
 
 
FIGURE 3. Aid Management Institutional Structure in South Korea before 2006 
 
 
Source: Adapted from OECD 2008b, p. 10 
 
 
In 2005, however, the Overall Policy Improvement Framework of the Korean government 
proposed the International Aid Act. This Act regulates the official development aid (ODA) 
scheme including the establishment of relevant bodies, grants, loans and policies. A year later, 
in line with the measures of the Committee for International Aid Policy, the Committee on 
International Development Cooperation (CIDC) was established. Currently, the CIDC consists 
of staff members from relevant ministries, including MOFAT and the MOSF, along with 
experts who were appointed from outside the government system (PMO, 2012). According to 
the Korean government, the CIDC was initially planned to consolidate all aid management 
institutions in the country by dealing with aid policies and strategies, aid system improvement, 
annual, mid-term and long-term plans, and operation (Office for Government Policy 
Coordination of the Republic of Korea, 2005). Nevertheless, when Korea underwent its special 
review in 2008, the OECD DAC recommended creating a ‘less fragmented aid system with 
more unified strategies’ (OECD, 2008b, p. 22), and as a result, the process of change for an 
advanced model of aid management was presented by the Korean government during the peer 
review in 2012, as shown in Figure 4.  
 
 
FIGURE 4. Aid Management Institutional Structure in South Korea since 2006 
 
 
Source: Adapted from OECD 2012a, p. 63 
 
 
Nonetheless, the peer review recommendations on institutional structure in Korea’s aid 
management system remain unimplemented in the years between the 2008 special review and 
the 2012 peer review, and the number of government ministries and agencies involved in aid 
activities remained the same, at over 30 organisations (OECD, 2008b, p. 1, 2012a, p. 17). As a 
result, the OECD DAC constantly emphasised the importance of policy coherence amongst 
fragmented institutions. However, in spite of efforts towards policy coherence, the final peer 
review report demonstrates that Korea still needs to ‘build on the solid legal and policy 
foundations’ (OECD, 2012a, p. 34), and ‘enhance policy coherence for development’ through 
the leadership of the CIDC and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) (OECD, 2012, p. 43). This 
recommendation differed little from the 2008 special review recommendation relating to the 
need for ‘a single entity with sole authority over development cooperation objectives, policy 
and strategy, which can develop a united policy framework, which leads and applies to all parts 
of the ODA system’ (OECD, 2008b, p. 12).  
Furthermore, the need to strengthen the leadership roles of the PMO and CIDC were again 
highlighted (OECD, 2012a), suggesting that the CIDC did not properly play its directive role 
with regards to Korea’s aid management system by the time of special review. During the peer 
review sessions as well as the review for the subsequent peer review report, more than eight 
ministries and agencies gave their inputs into the revision (The Government of Korea, 2012). 
This signifies the continued culture of division in Korea's aid institutions, resulting in the slow 
implementation of peer review recommendations. As such, between 2008 and 2012, there has 
been little substantive change in the nature of Korea's aid management system despite the 
constant pressure from the OECD DAC and other peer member countries.  
As noted above, the OECD DAC has persuaded its members to establish clear public 
political statements, such as White Papers, which demonstrate the will to comply with 
international norms through the national policies. However, when the first peer review was 
carried out, Korea still lacked clear policy documents on development cooperation, and major 
government policy papers tend to remain classified (OECD, 2012a). As a result, both special 
review and peer review reports have repeatedly stated the importance of a leadership body 
which can lead the process of implementation of OECD DAC recommendations. However, it 
turns out that neither the CIDC nor the PMO have the requisite leadership capacity to carry out 
legislative changes enabling the implementation of DAC standards. Instead, the MOSF has 
shown a strong tendency towards exercising its budget veto power as a means of increasing its 
bargaining power vis-a-vis other ministries. As noted in the peer review report, projects and 
programmes approved by the Inter-Agency Committees and endorsed by the CIDC have been 
rejected by the MOSF on the basis of its own specific approval criteria (OECD, 2012a), as 
shown in Figure 5.  
 
 
FIGURE 5. Aid Planning and Budgeting Process in Korea, as of 2012 
 
 
Source: Adapted from OECD 2012a, p. 48 
 
 
Furthermore, during the fourth stage of the OECD DAC peer review process, it transpired 
that the MOSF was strongly opposed to recommendations concerning levels of ODA.  
Initially, in the document prepared on 20 November 2012, recommendation article 3.1 was 
stated as: 
 
Korea should increase the ratio of grants to loans for fragile states and highly-indebted 
poor countries (HIPCs) and consider phasing out loans to these countries over time to 
ensure debt sustainability (OECD, 2012d, p. 5). 
 
However, the article has now changed to the following: 
 
Korea should assess carefully the ratio of grants to loans for fragile states and highly-
indebted poor countries (HIPCs) and when extending loans consider carefully the 
economic context and financial governance of these countries to ensure debt 
sustainability (OECD, 2012e, p. 5).  
 
As mentioned above, the MOSF takes primary responsibility for the disbursement of loans, 
and thus, does not agree to any reduction in the proportion of loans in Korea's total ODA. As 
such, the MOSF’s political interests within the broader governmental system have become 
obstacles to behavioural change towards OECD DAC regulations. The MOSF’s interests are, 
furthermore, inconsistent with the OECD DAC Recommendation on Terms and Conditions of 
Aid, which requires donors to include least developed countries (LDCs) within their portfolios. 
Following the special review, Korea has also been under pressure to integrate grants and 
concessional loans (see OECD, 2008b, p. 18), whereas the MOSF continues to maintain or 
even increase the polarisation of aid types. Since the peer review results were published, the 
MOSF-controlled Exim Bank of Korea has argued that Korea no longer needs to comply with 
the DAC standards but rather needs to ‘overcome its complex’ and adopt a ‘differentiated aid 
system and mechanism based on Korea's unique circumstances.’ Indeed, the DAC peer review 
examiners concluded that Korea has a ‘relatively consolidated ODA system compared to other 
DAC members’ (see Korea Exim Bank 2013, pp. 1- 3). These narratives demonstrate the degree 
to which a dominant institution such as the MOSF's has little interest in the implementation of 
DAC principles. This lack of interest has prevented the emergence of the consolidated political 
will necessary to adopt and implement global norms relating to development cooperation 
within Korea. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This study has examined the reasons why member states vary in terms of their 
implementation of OECD DAC directives. Given the overwhelmingly European focus of the 
existing literature on compliance, the study established two propositions relevant to non-
European cases. As such, the article has examined the case of Korea, a new member state of 
the OECD DAC system and has suggested that the compliance of DAC member states are not 
that much different from cases of the compliance of European countries with other international 
laws. The Korean case shows consistency in terms of the propositions drawn by the theories. 
First, the fragmented institutional structure and lack of strong directive capacity in Korea limits 
ability to comply as a result of the government’s bureaucratic inefficiency, as in most of the 
OECD DAC member states. The article also demonstrates that the domestic institutional 
structure has a strong relation to bureaucratic capacity for compliance. Second, the lack of 
interest on the part of the legislative powers at the domestic level has been a critical obstacle 
for establishing a consolidated national political will for compliance. Not only in Korea, but 
also in most of the member states, the lack of political will at the highest levels of the 
government hierarchy as well as the divergent political interests of the leading institutions have 
led to a lack of behavioural change towards the implementation of international principles and 
norms. Especially in Korea, it is significant that the development cooperation system evolved 
on the basis of the experiences, trends and culture of the governmental system.  
The implications of this study are that the special review and peer review mechanism can 
be an effective methodology for new DAC donors to identify the barriers to change. In the 
Korean case, it is evident that the special review and peer review as well as the onset of DAC 
membership more broadly have improved the domestic conceptualisation of international 
norms across ministries and agencies. However, Korea’s aid management system only can be 
transformed once it achieves a consolidated national political consensus amongst institutions. 
As such, the findings of this article illustrate that challenges such as a negative influence of a 
dichotomous institutional structure may slowly wither away as a result of continuous pressure 
and persuasion and peer countries but also by the domestic political processes. With this in 
mind, future DAC candidates can benefit from the lessons learned from the Korean case: to 
adopt and conform to the global principles and standards of development cooperation 
mechanism only when they are in ready for restructuring their aid management systems, 
including institutional arrangements, before commencing the membership with a consolidated 
political will to change at the domestic level. 
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